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Abstract—Modern single-photon detectors based on avalanche
photodiodes offer increasingly higher triggering speeds, thus
fostering their use in several fields, prominently in the recent
area of Quantum Key Distribution. It is well known that after
a detection event these detectors loose their single photons
sensitivity for a period of time generically called dead time. If
the acquisition system connected to the detector is not properly
designed, and the triggering function not properly controlled,
efficiency issues can arise when the triggering rate is faster than
the inverse of detector’s dead-time. Moreover, when this happens
with two or more detectors used in coincidence, a security risk
called “self-blinding” can jeopardize the distribution of a secret
quantum key.
In this paper we introduce a trigger-disabling circuitry based on
an FPGA-driven feedback loop, so to avoid the above-mentioned
inconveniences. In the regime of single-photon-attenuated light,
the electronics dynamically accept a trigger only after detectors’
complete recovery from dead-time. This technique proves useful
to work with detectors at their maximum speed and to increase
the security of a quantum key distribution setup.
Index Terms—Single-photon detector, quantum key distribu-
tion, quantum hacking, detector blinding, detector dead-time,
high-speed detection, quantum efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN ORDER to detect a light signal attenuated at thesingle-photon level [1], the Single-Photon Avalanche Diode
(SPAD) is of widespread use. SPADs have been employed to
detect stars feeble light [2], to perform a sharp optical time-
domain reflectometry [3] and in the vast majority of Quantum
Key Distribution (QKD) realizations reported thus far [4], [5],
[6], both in optical fibres and in free space. In particular, fibre-
based QKD at the wavelength of 1550 nm, is an emerging
technology which promises a high security level in telecom-
munications while retaining quite a high transmission rate. In
this wavelength range, the SPAD features quantum efficiencies
up to 25% [7] and trigger rates of more than 1 GHz [8], [9],
[10], [11], [12].
Let us briefly describe some particular aspects of the SPAD.
First, in order to increase the detector’s gain, the detector is
operated in the so called “Geiger mode”, where a reverse
bias voltage higher than the detector’s breakdown voltage
is applied. If, despite the high gain, the dark count rate is
low, the SPAD can be operated in “free running” mode; this
usually happens at wavelengths close to the visible range,
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e.g. 800 nm. If the dark count rate is high, as it happens
in the infrared domain, e.g. at wavelengths of 1550 nm,
then the SPAD is usually run in “gated mode”, where the
bias voltage is raised above the breakdown voltage only for
a short period of time (the gate), when the photon to be
detected is expected to arrive. This requires that the SPAD
is well synchronized with the light source and the rest of
the acquisition system. Another important point to consider
is that the dark count rate can be increased by a non zero
afterpulse probability: a detection event is given in the SPAD
by an avalanche of electric charges, some of which can remain
trapped in the junction and can be released in the following
gates, thus giving rise to additional counts not corresponding to
the arrival of new photons. To reduce the afterpulse probability,
an afterpulse blocking electronics [13] is usually added to
the SPAD with the aim of “freezing” it after the emission
of an avalanche, for a time interval decided in advance by the
operator. For example, one of the most popular single-photon
detector in the third Telecom window, the id201 from IDQ [7],
features an afterpulse probability going to nearly zero in about
4 µs. [14]. This entails that, in order to minimize dark counts,
a blocking time of at least 10 µs should be applied to this
detector. During the blocking time, the detector is not capable
to detect single photons anymore. Hereafter, we generically
define “dead time” any interval of time in which the SPAD
looses its single-photon sensitivity. This can be due either
to the natural response of the detector or to the afterpulse
blocking circuit. Moreover, we focus on a SPAD run in gated
mode, suitable for working in a high-noise regime, leaving the
free-running mode analysis for a future work.
In order to use a gated-mode SPAD, it is necessary to
prepare an acquisition system capable of sending a trigger to
it, read its output in a synchronized way and write the result
into a memory location. However, during the preparation of
such a system, we realized that a few problems arise when
the triggering rate of the acquisition system is higher than the
inverse of detector’s dead-time. This situation is much more
widespread than commonly believed. In fact, the acquisition
system is usually much faster than the SPAD and its triggering
rate coincides with the maximum rate allowed by the detector.
For instance, the same id201 mentioned above, accepts a
maximum trigger rate of 8 MHz, which is much higher than
the 100 KHz corresponding to the inverse of the dead-time
value given above, i.e. 10 µs.
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2One problem related to a SPAD running at its maximum
trigger rate and with a non-zero dead-time, is the readout.
If the acquisition system tries to read the SPAD during the
dead-time period it only collects a sequence of futile counts
which do not correspond to true detection events. The removal
of these counts by a postprocessing algorithm is simple but
very inefficient, time- and memory-consuming. A second,
more important, problem is that when two or more SPADs
are present in the same detection apparatus, one detector
can be active while the other is blind. This happens, e.g.,
when one of the two detectors registers a photon and enters
the dead-time period while the other does not register any
photon and remains active. This situation can be exploited
to control the detectors of the receiving unit, as described
in [15]. Furthermore, in a wholly passive way, this flaw can
be exploited to threaten the security of the QKD technology,
by making the key distilled by the users not perfectly random
and not entirely secret, as we shall show.
We group these security breaches under the name of “self-
blinding”, because they are caused mainly by an improper use
of the equipment by the legitimate users.
In this paper we describe an acquisition system that allows
for a proper triggering of single-photon detectors. We use an
FPGA-based electronics to disable not only the trigger driving
the SPAD gates but also the one driving the readout and the
write up of the data to the memory. Hence useless data are
no more registered by the acquisition system; the memory is
better organized and the postprocessing procedures require a
shorter time. Moreover the triggering technique can be easily
extended to two or more detectors, so to avoid self-blinding.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we describe
our technique and apply it to a single SPAD. In Section III
we consider the situation with a pair of SPADs and describe
the security risks connected to self-blinding. In Section IV
we apply our technique to a real setup and demonstrate its
effectiveness. Section V is left for concluding remarks.
II. REAL-TIME DISABLING OF THE TRIGGER
The trigger-disabling acquisition system is schematically
shown in Figure 1. The main element of the circuit is the
clock buffer (CLK BUF) with clock enable CE input (bottom
part of the figure). Its specifications are given in [17]. This
buffer drives the clock output which in turn is connected
to the detector’s trigger input and memory clock input. In
normal regime, the D flip-flop (FFD) is reset; the output is
inverted and then fed into the clock buffer so the trigger
clock is simply transferred from the input to the output and
then to the detector. When a positive detection occurs, the
rising edge of the SPAD’s avalanche drives the change in the
FFD output, thus disabling the main clock and enabling the
COUNTER. The SPAD and the MEMORY will not see any
trigger in this state. The FFD remains in this state until it
is reset. The asynchronous reset occurs after a given number
of main clock cycles, depending on the COUNTER and the
binary comparator (COMP) level indicated as CMP VALUE in
Fig. 1. All the circuitry is realized in an FPGA board (Xilinx
SP605).
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Fig. 1. Conceptual scheme of clock manager. FFD - D flip-flop latch,
COUNTER - binary counter, COMP - binary comparator, CLK BUF - clock
buffer, MEMORY - cache memory for storing detection results. For clarity
the scheme does not include time correlations. To synchronize recording time
and detection event additional elements are required.
The trigger-disabling circuit has a main constraint i.e. the re-
sponse time-interval τresp that goes from the SPAD avalanche
to the CLK BUF must be smaller than the inverse of the trigger
rate ωtrig:
τresp <
1
ωtrig
. (1)
If this condition is not fulfilled, the trigger pulses continue
to arrive at the detector until the clock buffer succeeds in
disabling the trigger. This would result in maximal frequency
limitation or in one or more futile zeroes registration by the
QKD apparatus’s cache memory.
Several factors contribute to the total response time
of the feedback loop: the detector response (28 ns for
id200/id201 [7], which are the SPADs used in our setup), the
length of cables (8 ns) and circuit inside FPGA (2 ns). This
sets a maximum limit for the trigger-disabling technique with
our current electronics at 26 MHz, which is much above the
maximal trigger rate for id201. Shortening the total response
time would increase the maximal frequency of the circuit.
However, among the above delays, only the one caused by
cables can be decreased easily without changing any other
piece of hardware.
In order to demonstrate the circuit working, we applied
our electronics to a real setup, composed by a laser source
(PicoQuant LDH-P-1550) triggered at 4 MHz, an optical
attenuator, which fixes the average photon number at µ ' 0.1,
and a SPAD id201 set at 2.5 ns gate and 10% efficiency.
In this configuration, we analyzed the percentage of cache
memory occupied by useful triggers over a total duration of 12
hours [18]. The results are plotted in Fig. 2. If trigger-disabling
is applied, the cache memory is occupied by useful data only,
entailing that all the triggers sent to the SPAD have been
effectively used for a meaningful acquisition. By consequence,
the trigger-percentage per cache reaches the maximum, 100%.
On the contrary, if the disabling technique is not applied, the
total amount of useful counts per cache varies according to
the photon emission probability and detector dead-time. In
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Fig. 2. Number of useful triggers per data sample. The lower solid curve
shows percentage of useful triggers in cache in case of a standard triggering
technique. It lays around a percentage value of 81%. When trigger-disabling
technique is applied all the triggers are useful, thus reaching a percentage
of 100% (upper solid line). The dotted line is a theoretical prediction when
µ = 0.1 and η = 0.1, providing a percentage of 83.4%. Nine hundred
samples were taken in 12 hours [18].
particular, a lower percentage corresponds to a situation with
more counts by the SPAD, i.e. to a higher intensity arriving at
the detector. In fact, the more counts at the SPAD, the higher
the number of futile zeroes present in the cache memory. Any
futile zero must be removed from the cache which causes that
the percentage of useful triggers remains significantly lower
than 100%. There are two ways of removal, either by post-
processing or by disabling the trigger before it arrives to the
SPAD. In any case the post-processing consumes more time
than a hardware solution [18].
Further performance analysis shows that the amount of
removed triggers from cache depends on the product of the
average photon number µ and detector quantum efficiency η.
In fact, the probability of a positive detection per each light
pulse is given by P = 1 − exp(−µη). Each time a pulse is
detected, we have 1 useful trigger and M useless triggers,
which fall inside the detector’s dead time. These triggers have
to be removed, either by post-processing or by disabling the
trigger before it arrives to the SPAD. In any case, given N
total triggers arriving at the measuring setup and k positive
detections, the percentage of useful triggers is given by:
Puseful =
N − kM
N
. (2)
The average number of positive detection k is found through
a numerical simulation. The result is directly substituted in
Eq. (2) to find the average percentage P useful as function of µ
and η. The parameters of the simulation were the following:
µ = 0.1, η = 0.1, M = 20, N = 8192, resulting in
k ' 68 and P useful ' 83.4. This last value has been used in
Fig. 2 to plot the dotted curve corresponding to the theoretical
model. The number of useful triggers per block of cache
memory fluctuates in time. Short-term fluctuations are caused
by detector’s random behavior while long-term fluctuation
are caused by an imperfect photon source whose intensity
fluctuates. The trigger-disabling technique makes the amount
of useful triggers per block of cache memory independent of
these factors, as showed in Fig. 2, because only useful triggers
are present in that case.
III. PAIRWISE DETECTION AND SELF-BLINDING
The technique described in the previous section can be
fruitfully implemented when two or more SPADs are used at
the same time, for instance in experiments where coincidence
detection is important, or in QKD implementations, where
each detector is assigned with a logical value of one bit, ‘0’ or
‘1’, and with a measurement basis, Z or X . The sequence of
the bits will constitute, after a classical distillation procedure,
the secret quantum key used for secure telecommunications.
For the moment we consider a practical setup with only
two detectors, which we call respectively D0 and D1, assigned
with the value ‘0’ or ‘1’ of the key bit. Such a description well
adapts to what routinely happens in QKD implementations
when, e.g., the BB84 protocol [4] is performed with an active
choice of the basis (see e.g. [19] and [20]). In this case it is
crucial for security that both detectors are active or inactive at
the same time. If one detector is active and the other one is
blind, e.g. during the dead-time following a positive detection
event, then a security risk comes about [15].
In the standard scenario of QKD there are two main
users, traditionally called Alice (the transmitter) and Bob (the
receiver), who try to communicate privately over an insecure
quantum channel, plus one eavesdropper, Eve, who aims to
steal information from the channel. Eve can use any means
allowed by the laws of physics to reach her goal. She can also
exploit an imperfection of the setup to her own advantage. For
example in [15] it is described how to exploit the detectors’
dead-time to hack a particular QKD setup when the detectors
are used in free-running mode. The same technique, which is
a variant of the “faked-state attack” [21], can be adapted to
hack also a setup based on gated-mode detectors, if a narrow
temporal selection inside the gate is effected by the users to
further clean their quantum signal [15]. This technique, though
very powerful, requires an active intervention by Eve, who
has to carefully design her light pulses and synchronize them
with those transmitted by Alice to Bob. Furthermore, it is not
effective against a QKD setup based on gated-mode detectors
in which there is no temporal selection inside the gate. In
that case, the eavesdropping described in [15] would cause an
abnormal number of double counts, easily detectable by the
legitimate users.
In the following, we restrict our attention to such a kind
of QKD setup, using gated-mode SPADs with no temporal
filter inside the gate. We describe a totally passive action
by Eve which is sufficient to create a security risk for the
communication. Our aim is not to provide an attack which
gives Eve 100% of the information sent by Alice; we only
want to show that some extra bit could possibly be captured
by Eve without the legitimate users being aware of that.
Let us focus then on the typical situation of self-blinding:
at Bob’s side one detector is active while the other one is
blind. This can happen in a QKD setup with a trigger rate
higher than the inverse of detector’s dead-time, which we
define here as τd. After the whole quantum communication is
completed, Bob announces on a public channel the addresses
corresponding to his non-vacuum counts; all the remaining
addresses are associated to vacuum counts and are discarded
4by the users. Eve will register all the counts announced by
Bob, in particular those which correspond to qubits distant
in time less than τd. All these bits will be necessarily anti-
correlated. In fact, suppose that at a certain time t′ detector
D0 fires and Bob registers a ‘0’. If a second event occurs at
time t′′ with |t′′− t′| < τd, it must come necessarily from D1,
because D0 is in its dead-time period. So Bob will see a ‘1’.
If another count occurs at time t′′′ with |t′′′− t′′| < τd it must
necessarily be a ‘0’, and so on. The net result will be that with
a small, but non-zero, probability there will be in the final key
groups of bits which are anti-correlated (e.g. 1010101...) rather
than perfectly random. This is already a security breach in the
theory of QKD. In fact, the two requisites for unconditional
secure communication are (i) that the final key should be
random and (ii) that it should be known only to the legitimate
users [22]. So the first requisite here is violated.
Now we want to show that also the second requisite of
security can be violated by the passive strategy described
above, i.e. some bits of the final key can be learned by Eve
without Alice and Bob being aware of that. In fact, after the
addresses of the non-vacuum counts have been announced,
the standard description of QKD [5] prescribes that Alice and
Bob proceed with two classical procedures known as Error
Correction (EC) [23] and Privacy Amplification (PA) [24].
EC aims at correcting potential errors (i.e. different bits) in
the users’ final keys. During this procedures a few bits are
revealed on public by the users to localize and finally correct
the errors. Eventually the wrong bits and their positions will be
known to Eve too. With PA, the users are supposed to reduce
Eve’s knowledge about these bits to nearly zero. However it
can happen that some of these bits fall into a group which
contains anti-correlated bits, e.g. 10101. In that case it is plain
that Eve will immediately know all the members of the group
as soon as she knows a single bit of the group. Hence the PA
will erase Eve’s knowledge about the single bit revealed, but
not her knowledge about the remaining bits.
The attack just described is entirely passive, as it is the result
of a bad setup configuration by the users. For this reason we
called it self-blinding. As already mentioned, self-blinding can
occur when detector’s dead-time is higher than the inverse of
the trigger rate:
τd >
1
ωtrigger
. (3)
The truer this inequality, the easier the self-blinding mecha-
nism. It is worth noting that the above self-blinding condition,
Eq. (3), is easy to fulfill, so it could represent a common
mistake when using the SPADs. The reason is that one usually
sets the electronics for a long dead-time, to reduce the after-
pulses, and at the same time for a high trigger speed, to
increase the final transmission rate.
One solution against self-blinding is to slow down the
triggering rate of the QKD apparatus, until Eq. (3) is no
more satisfied, but this dramatically reduces the total efficiency
of the system. Another possibility is to remove all the bits
featuring a temporal distance less than τd by post-processing,
but this can be very time-consuming. Also, one could resort
to alternative descriptions of QKD [25], [26] in which the bits
for EC are encrypted, so the positions of the errors will be
not known to Eve at all. But this solves only the second flaw,
not the first, i.e., the bits of the final key would still be not
purely random. Our solution is based on hardware. We simply
apply the trigger-disabling technique to guarantee that Bob’s
detectors are both active or both inactive at the same time.
In the next Section we describe how this can be put into
practice and present the experimental results obtained with this
technique.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL PAIRWISE DETECTION WITH
TRIGGER-DISABLING
In order to disable the triggering clock in case of a pairwise
detector configuration we used a modified version of the circuit
shown in Fig. 1. We connected both detectors outputs to the
clock input port C of FFD through an OR gate, and fed
their trigger input with the same signal coming from CLOCK
OUTPUT.
To show the effectiveness of the trigger-disabling technique
we applied the electronics to a real setup composed by two
SPADs, one id201, as before, and one id200. Both detectors
are triggered at 4 MHz. We notice that the id201 detector
is one of the receiving units in the “All-Vienna” QKD sys-
tem [28], used in two recent quantum networks [29], [30].
According to what reported in Ref. [28], the system’s average
trigger rate was of 415 KHz. Hence Eq. (3) entails that self-
blinding becomes important for that setup if a dead-time longer
than 2.4 µs is used. On the other side, the id200 detector was
used in the QKD system described in [20], and in the setup
for the asymmetric feedback adopted in [31]. In Ref. [20] the
trigger rate was 2.5 MHz and the dead-time 10 µs, so the self-
blinding could have had an influence in that case. However,
it should be noted that the QKD protocol used was not the
BB84 but rather the LM05 [32], in which the two detectors
are not directly associated to the logical bit value. Hence the
above analysis is not directly applicable to this case.
In the present paper’s experiment we studied two figures of
the apparatus, i.e., the frequency of coincidence counts and the
randomness of the final key. In both cases we employed a light
with intensity higher than the single-photon level, to simulate
the detectors’ response under the Eve attack described above.
In the previous experiment the value of µ was about 0.1. Now
it is µ ' 4.
In order to see the frequency of coincidence counts, we
collected more than 107 events. We registered 13.5% of coin-
cidences with trigger disabling ON and only 3.0% with trigger
disabling OFF. This confirms that our technique reduces the
probability of a self-blinding, because the two detectors are
always operational together. Notice that the coincidence rate
is not 100% even when trigger disabling is ON, because the
light is not intense enough. A much more intense light would
cause 100% coincidence counts if the trigger disabling is ON,
but could also damage the very sensitive SPAD.
On a second step we monitored the randomness of the
strings obtained from detectors when trigger disabling was
either ON or OFF. Specifically we assigned a click from
detector D0 (D1) and no click from detector D1 (D0) with
the value ‘0’ (‘1’), and collected all the values so to form
5two strings, one corresponding to ON and one to OFF. Two
short sequences extracted from such strings are reported in
Fig. 3; the empty (filled) circles correspond to the value ‘0’
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Fig. 3. Sequences of events corresponding to detector D0 firing and D1 not
firing (empty circles) or D1 firing and D0 not firing (filled circles). Top panel:
a sequence of clearly non-random events, obtained when the trigger-disabling
technique was OFF. The alternate occurrence of empty and filled circles is
apparent. Bottom panel: a sequence of events looking like random, obtained
when the trigger-disabling technique is ON. The occurrence of relatively long
sequences of empty and filled dots together with short sequences witnesses
the random-like nature of the string. The events with both detectors firing have
been removed for explicative purposes. For the measurement we employed a
light with average photon-number µ ' 4.
(‘1’). The difference is quite apparent. When trigger disabling
is OFF (upper string), the sequence is clearly non random,
since almost always a single 0 is followed by a single 1,
and viceversa. On the contrary, when trigger disabling is ON
(lower sequence), the occurrence of a 0 or a 1 is much
less foreseeable. Also, the presence of relatively long sub-
strings filled with all 0’s or 1’s, is an additional evidence of
a random behavior. Note that while non-randomness can be
easily demonstrated, for true randomness of finite sequences
is not that easy since it does not exist a decisive test in
this respect. Nevertheless we performed the DIEHARDER
statistical tests [33] on our strings, most of which were passed
by the ON string and none was passed by the OFF string.
It could be argued that our choice µ ' 4 is somewhat
unusual in a QKD setup, where one has more often µ ' 0.1.
Our choice is motivated by the purpose of showing clearly in
the experiment the effect of self-blinding. When µ is smaller,
the consequences of self-blinding are smaller too, but they
do not disappear as there still remains a non zero probability
to find blocks in the final key containing anti-correlated, non
random, bits.
V. CONCLUSION
We introduced a FPGA-driven technique to run a single-
photon avalanche diode at its maximum trigger rate, regardless
of dead-time limitation. While in standard situations some care
should be paid when the trigger rate is higher than the inverse
of dead-time, with our technique this hindrance is removed by
a trigger-disabling loop which stops the trigger to and from
the SPAD until it has properly recovered from the dead-time
period. The presented circuit can also serve as a simple dead-
time generator for single-photon detectors which are produced
without their own generator.
Because of the absence of any futile counts, our technique is
especially useful in case of implementation in embedded QKD
systems as in this case one needs to record a huge amount
of results in a limited local memory. Moreover the technique
allows to remove completely the post-processing related to
futile zeroes discarding, what results in shorter acquisition
time.
We provided an experimental evidence of our technique
applied to a single SPAD, by reporting the trigger distribution
in the acquisition system’s cache memory. Additionally, we
adapted the acquisition system to a pair of detectors used in
coincidence and found an evident advantage of the trigger-
disabling technique over a standard trigger usage in terms
of distribution of the coincidence counts and in terms of
randomness of the final string distilled from detectors’ counts.
Moreover, it removes at the roots the possibility of an external
attack based on “self-blinding”, because it forces the detectors
in the receiving unit to be active or inactive altogether, at the
same time.
The proposed technique can be easily implemented in
many different setup by just adding a piece of electronics in
front of a standard SPAD, thus making the detector response
time as short as possible. This paves the way to a future
straightforward implementation of this technique in integrated
commercial QKD apparatuses.
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